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Abstract 
This work presents an introduction to the Time Of 
Check to Time Of Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability as 
well as the development of a user-space library that 
hooks vulnerable system calls and modifies their 
behavior.   
Introduction 
Race conditions may arise when performing 
operations that involve the file system because there 
is no guarantee of atomicity for I/O operations or 
consistency of the file system. These vulnerabilities 
are a true menace to integrity, availability and 
confidentiality of information systems since they 
may allow an attacker to escalate privileges. These 
vulnerabilities, known as Time Of Check to Time Of 
Use (TOCTOU), are a true challenge given their non-
deterministic nature. Detecting and preventing them 
is an open research field. Their reproduction is 
equally difficult because their exploitability depends 
upon external factors such as system load or 
environment variables. This work presents a study of 
the vulnerability as well as our attempt at thwarting 
TOCTOU by implement a user-space library that 
replaces current file system calls with safer versions. 
TOCTOU Overview 
TOCTOU may arise when a given program performs 
several consecutive system calls that reference file 
system objects via their name, also known as 
pathname. UNIX-like operating systems are 
especially prone to such race conditions given their 
file system nature. These operations are neither 
atomic or isolated in the system. That is, an attacker 
could modify the underlying file system between any 
given consecutive system calls since the file system 
is shared among all running processes [1]. Since 
TOCTOU requires two or more consecutive non-
atomic file-related operations, it is safe to say 
TOCTOU happens in two steps [2]: 
1. The vulnerable program checks some 
condition about a given file, the Time Of 
Check. 
2. The vulnerable program modifies the file 
assuming the previous condition still holds, 
the Time Of Use. 
In order to be profitable by an attacker, the vulnerable 
program must be running with higher privileges than 
the attacker. That is, TOCTOU could be present but 
its exploitation could provide no benefit. If the 
vulnerable program is running with higher privileges, 
e.g. SUID to root, and an attacker is able to 
successfully exploit it, they will be able to potentially 
escalate that privileges. In UNIX universe, this 
translates to the attacker being a user with lesser 
privileges than the running program. It is also strictly 
necessary for the vulnerability to be exploitable that 
the attacker must have permissions to modify the 
referenced file. This implies that there are several 
directories immune to TOCTOU like /root or /bin, 
amongst many others [3].  
TOCTOU is usually present in UNIX-like operating 
systems due to their referencing and path traversal 
mechanism. These OS allow users to reference file 
objects using either pathnames or file descriptors. 
When using pathnames, the application is susceptible 
to TOCTOU because the relation pathname-file 
object is not static and it can be modified by external 
processes. On the other hand, using file descriptors 
makes the application immune to TOCTOU since file 
descriptors refer to a single file object and cannot be 
modified by external agents[4]. 
Defending against TOCTOU 
We developed a defense against TOCTOU that 
consists of a user-space library that intercepts 
vulnerable system calls. It changes the behavior of 
the original system call so it performs additional 
checks and verifies the integrity of the referenced file 
objects between system calls. Depending upon the 
result of the verification the library either calls the 
original system call (no race condition was detected) 
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or aborts the program’s execution (race condition 
detected) thus thwarting the exploitation attempt.  
The library is loaded dynamically in the memory 
space of every single process executed in the system 
whose real user ID (RUID) or real group user ID 
(RGID) differs from the process’ effective user ID 
(EUID) or effective group ID (EGID). It is loaded by 
the dynamic linker before any other library so when 
a program performs a access() call, for example, it 
executes our version of the function instead. This 
behavior is achieved thanks to /etc/ld.so.preload [5], 
[6]. 
Wei and Pu previously identified the set of 
vulnerable system calls that can result in TOCTOU 
[7]. Our library intercepts a total of 46 API functions 
that refer to file system objects via their name. 
Our library maintains and manages an internal per-
process list of referenced object and several metadata 
information like inode, path, device id or file mode. 
When an object is referenced for the first time, the 
information is retrieved and stored. Consecutive 
references to the same object are then checked 
against the cached information and if they do not 
match, and the process did not legitimately change 
the referenced object, it means an external process or 
agent modified the file. In this situation, the program 
is aborted and the logs are updated.  
Limitations 
When testing our library, we found several 
limitations that we consider as future improvements.  
The most critical limitation we found is that our 
library could be a victim of TOCTOU as well. The 
reason behind this is that we are adding a mediation 
layer between the application and the current API, 
but the underneath system calls remain unchanged. 
TOCTOU happens within the API and it would 
require changes in the kernel to completely remove 
the vulnerability.  
Another limitation is related to cooperating 
processes. Since our library maintains the metadata 
information on a per-process basis, whenever a 
process performs a fork() or exec() and the 
subsequent processes legitimately change the file 
object, our library would result in a false positive thus 
aborting legitimate programs.  
Additionally, our library hooks standard C 
implementation of such functions (GLIBC) but there 
could be others. Furthermore, our library is limited to 
dynamically-linked programs. Statically-linked 
binaries are not protected by our library since their 
execution does not involve the dynamic linker.  
Conclusions 
We presented an introduction to TOCTOU 
vulnerability and how it can be exploited by any 
given attacker. Additionally, we presented our own 
approach when thwarting exploitation attempts. Our 
user-space library hooks vulnerable system calls and 
performs additional checks in order to detect external 
manipulations of the referenced file objects.  
TOCTOU vulnerability is still a menace to UNIX-
like operating systems. Its detection is difficult given 
its non-determinism and how subtle it is to detect and 
be aware-of. Many defenses have been previously 
proposed but they either are not enough or have been 
defeated. Given the current state, defending against 
TOCTOU falls on programmers and, from a security 
perspective, that is not viable. Security-aware 
programming requires a lot of experience and is both 
error-prone and a very difficult task. 
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